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SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Louis Fishert 
Constitutions do not govern by text alone, even as interpreted by a su-
preme body of judges. Constitutions draw their life from forces outside the 
Jaw: from ideas, customs, society, and the constant dialogue among political 
institutions. In South Carolina v. United States (1905), the Supreme Court 
stated that the Constitution "is a written instrument. As such its meaning does 
not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now." Having announced 
the conventional formula, the Court immediately noted: "Being a grant of 
powers to a government its language is general, and as changes come in social 
and political life it embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are within 
the scope of the powers in terms conferred." 
Just as the Supreme Court leaves its mark on American society, so do 
social forces determine constitutional law. The Court, regarded as a nonpolitical 
and independent branch of government is very much a product of its times. 
Justice Cardozo remarked that the"great tides and currents which engulf the 
rest of men do not tum aside in their course and pass the judges by." 1 Courts 
are obviously buffeted by social pressures. To what extent is difficult to say. 
We see the final result in a decision but must speculate how the court got 
there. The link betweek social cause and judicial effect cannot be measured 
with scientific accuracy, or anything approaching it, but we can make reasonable 
and informed judgments about social influences on constitutional law. 
This essay begins by discussing the social environment in which cases 
are decided. For their own institutional protection, courts must take account 
of social movements and public opinion. In this brief essay I explore the his-
torical interactions between society and the judiciary in four areas: economic 
regulation, eugenics, racial discrimination, and women's rights. The essay 
concludes with some general observations about the relationship between ju-
dicial doctrines and contemporary social standards. 
THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
It is tempting to concentrate on decisional law and ignore the political, 
historical, and social framework in which decisions are handed down. Text-
books in constitutional law usually separate the courts from the rest of gov-
ernment and make unrealistic claims of judicial isolation. Morris Raphael 
Cohen, one of the early students of legal realism, denied that the law is a 
"closed, independent system having nothing to do with economic, political, 
social, or philosophical science." 2 It was Lord Ratcliffe who counseled that 
"we cannot learn law by learning law." Through this tantalizing phrase he 
meant that law must be "a part of history, a part of economics and sociol-
ogy, a part of ethics and a philosophy of life. It is not strong enough in itself 
to be a philosophy of itself." 3 
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It is too flippant to accept Mr. Dooley's pronouncement that the Su-
preme Court follows the election returns, but careful studies by Robert 
Dahl, David Adamany, and Richard Funston show that the Court generally 
stays within the political boundaries of its times. When it strays outside and 
opposes the policy of elected leaders, it does so at substantial risk to its le-
gitimacy. The Court maintains its effectiveness by steering a course that fits 
within the permissible limits of public opinion. This reality does not make it 
a political body in the same sense as Congress and the President, but prag-
matism and statesmanship must temper abstract legal analysis. Tocqueville 
noted in the 1840s that the power of the Supreme Court "is enormous, but 
it is the power of public opinion. They are all-powerful as long as the people 
respect the law; but they would be impotent against popular neglect or con-
tempt of the law." Federal judges "must be statesmen, wise to discern the 
signs of the times, not afraid to brave the obstacles that can be subdued, 
nor slow to turn away from the current when it threatens to sweep them off 
" 4 
The responsiveness of courts to the social community is even more im-
mediate at the local level. District courts regularly reflect public opinion on 
such matters as civil rights, labor relations, and sentencing of Vietnam re-
sisters . A conference of federal judges in 1961 agreed that public opinion 
"should not materially affect sentences" and that the judiciary "must stand 
firm against undue public opinion." Nevertheless, the judges cautioned that 
"this should not mean that the community's attitude must be completely ig-
nored in sentencing: although judges should be leaders of public opinion, 
they must never get so far out in front that the public loses sight of them" 5 
Social and political forces affect the process by which a multi-member 
Court gropes incrementally toward a consensus and a decision. In such 
areas as civil rights, sex discrimination, church and state, and criminal pro-
cedure, the Court moves with a series of half steps, disposing of the partic-
ular issue at hand while preparing for the next case. Through installments it 
lays the groundwork for a more comprehensive solution, always sensitive to 
the response of society and the institutions of government that must enforce 
judicial rulings. This social and political framework sets the boundaries for 
judicial activity and influences the substance of specific decisions, if not im-
mediately then within a few years. A purely technical approach to the law 
misses the constant, creative interplay that takes place between the judici-
ary and society at large. 
Since court opinions frequently turn on the "reasonableness" of govern-
ment actions, legal briefs attempt to amass sociological data and scientific 
findings. The "Brandeis brief' of 1908 was the forerunner of what is now a 
common tactic for both sides in a lawsuit. Through the publication of arti-
cles, books, and commission reports, authors hope to see their products 
cited in briefs and footnoted in court decisions. The practice of citing profes-
sional journals goes back at least to Justice Brandeis in the 1920s. Other 
Justices, like Cardozo and Stone, adopted this technique as a way of keeping 
law current with changes in American society. Brandeis' opinions introduced 
a new meaning to the word "authority." He believed that an opinion "de-
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rives its authority, just as law derives its existence, from all the facts of life. 
The judge is free to draw upon these facts wherever he can find them, if 
only they are helpful." 6 
ECONOMIC REGULATION 
From the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, the courts struck down 
a number of federal and state efforts to ameliorate industrial conditions. 
Laws that established maximum hours or minimum wages were declared an 
unconstitutional interference with the "liberty of contract." Lawyers from 
the corporate sector helped translate the philosophy of laissez faire into le-
gal terms and constitutional doctrine. Some of the intellectual sources were 
Herbet Spencer's Social Statics (1851), Thomas M. Cooley's Constitutional 
Limitations (1868), and Christopher G. Tiedeman's Treatise on the Limita-
tions of the Police Powers (1886). 
The climate of the years following the Civil War promoted the pursuit 
of material goals. Elitism by corporate leaders could not be justified by tradi-
tion (feudalism) or the will of God (Calvinism). Neither belief system fitted 
an age devoted to materialist thinking, scientific discovery, and capitalism. 
Justification took the form of Social Darwinism and the belief in self-interest 
and ruthless individualism. Survival and success became the overriding val-
ues. The American Bar Association was organized in 1878 to prevent legis-
latures from interfering with property rights. The spectre of "socialism" and 
communism gave added force and urgency to these efforts. In the first In-
come Tax Case of 1895, Joseph H. Choate warned the Court during oral ar-
gument that the tax "is communistic in its purposes and tendencies." In that 
decision, Justice Field predicted that "the present assault upon capital is but 
the beginning." Political contests would soon become "a war of the poor 
against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness." 
The courts of the nineteenth century had permitted legislatures and 
municipalities broad discretion under the "police power" to regulate public 
health and safety. The tone shifted slightly in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 
when a unanimous Supreme Court used the phrase "liberty to contract" and 
spoke in strong terms about a citizen's right to be free to earn his liveli-
hood. This general philosophy did not prevent the Court the next year from 
upholding Utah's eight-hour day for workers in coal mines and smelters. In 
1903 it sustained an eight-hour law in Kansas that covered all persons em-
ployed by the state or local governments, including work contracted by the 
state. 
Judicial tolerance of the police power came to an abrupt halt in Lochner 
v. New York (1905), which invalidated a New York law limiting bakery 
workers to 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Justice Peckham, writing for 
a 5-4 majority, converted the general right to make a contract into laissez-
faire rigidity. Such laws were "mere meddlesome interferences" with the 
rights of an individual to enter into contracts. In their dissent, Justices Har-
lan, White, and Day cited statistical support for remedial legislation. Peck-
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ham's opiruon was so spiced with conservative business doctrines that 
Holmes's dissent accused the majority of deciding "upon an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain." The Fourteenth 
Amendment, he said, "does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
ics." 
After Lochner, the Court equivocated on the principle of laissez-faire. 
In 1908 it struck down a congressional statute that made it unlawful for the 
railroads to fire workers because of their union membership. A 6-2 decision 
maintained the fiction of Lochner that the employer and employee had 
"equality of right" to enter into a contract. 7 In that same year, however, the 
Court in Muller v. Oregon sustained a 10-hour day for women. The statisti-
cal record referred to by the dissenters in Lochner supplied a good tactical 
clue for Louis D. Brandeis, who argued the case for Oregon. His brief of 
113 pages consisted almost entirely of copious data extracted from sociologi-
cal studies supporting the need to set maximum hours for women. 
Could the constitutional principle announced in Lochner be set aside by 
sociological data? The Court engaged in some judicial doubletalk. The infor-
mation supplied by Brandeis "may not be, technically speaking, authorities," 
but the facts were "significant of a widespread belief that women's physical 
structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify 
special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which she 
should be permitted to toil." The Court asserted that constitutional issues 
"are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion," for the 
value of a written constitution is that it places limits on legislative action. 
Nevertheless, the Court said that "when a question of fact is debated and 
debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional limitation goes is 
affected by the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long contin-
ued belief concerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cogni-
zance of all matters of general knowledge." 
In Bunting v. Oregon (1917), the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
Oregon's 10-hour day for men and women, including a provision for over-
time pay. Felix Frankfurter argued the case for Oregon and prepared a 
"Brandeis brief' that contained an array of facts and statistics to demon-
strate the effects of overtime on the physical and moral health of the 
worker. A 5-3 Court upheld the statute. Frankfurter was again lead counsel 
in defending a congressional statute that provided for minimum wages for 
women and children in the District of Columbia. Despite his lengthy socio-
logical brief, the Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) held the stat-
ute invalid. Writing for a 5-3 majority, Justice Sutherland found the mass of 
data compiled by Frankfurter "interesting but only mildly persuasive." Be-
cause of progress in contractual, political and civil rights of women since the 
Muller decision of 1908, Sutherland said that the continuation of protective 
legislation could not be justified. Although the Court had sustained statutes 
setting maximum hours, the minimum wage law seemed dangerous territory 
to the majority. What was next, Sutherland asked, maximum wages? 
Between 1923 and 1934, the Court repeatedly struck down statutes on 
the ground that the activity regulated was not "affected with a public inter-
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est." Inexorably, new areas of the economy became affected with a public 
interest. Subjects that had been intrastate, and thus within the jurisdiction of 
states, eventually fell across state lines and were brought within Congress' 
power over commerce. The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 punc-
tured the belief in a self-adjusting, stable free economy. 
The philosophy of Adkins survived as late as 1936, although a decision 
that year striking down New York's minimum wage law for women and chil-
dren could muster only a 5-4 majority.8 In one of the dissents, Justice Stone 
attacked the majority's reasoning: "It is difficult to imagine any grounds, 
other than our own personal economic predilections, for saying that the con-
tract of employment is any the less an appropriate subject of legislation than 
are scores of others, in dealing with which this Court has held that legisla-
tures may curtail individual freedom in the public interest." 
Adkins was finally overruled in 1937. Sutherland, Van Devanter, Mc-
Reynolds, and Butler, who had provided four of the majority votes in the ew 
York case, dissented. Roberts, the fifth member of that majority, now joined 
the other members of the Court to uphold a minimum wage law for women 
and minors in the state of Washington. 9 Justice Sutherland, speaking for the 
four dissenters in this case, assailed the idea that decisions should be recon-
sidered because of economic conditions: "the meaning of the Constitution does 
not change with the ebb and flow of economic events." The phrase "ebb and 
flow" implies a seasonal if not spasmodic quality, which seems offensive to a 
constitution grounded on fundamental principles. But the record of the Court 
on economic regulation was decidely one of ebb and flow. Over a period of 
four decades it tried to impose a Liberty of Contract theory at a time when 
changing economic institutions had shifted power dramatically from the em-
ployee to the employer. A countervailing force was needed and government 
intervened to redress the imbalance. 
By 1941 the ideological composition of the Court had been radically altered, 
especially with the appointments of Reed, Murphy, and Black to replace the 
conservative Sutherland, Butler, and Van Devanter . A unanimous Court that 
year upheld in United States v. Darby a congressional statute setting minimum 
wages and maximum hours for men and women. A combination of social, 
economic, and political forces had finally reversed the constitutional doctrines 
of the Court. As the Court remarked in Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963): "Whether 
the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert pencer, Lord 
Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours." After retiring from the Court, 
Justice Roberts said this about the expansion of national power over economic 
conditions: "Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted 
the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country - for what in 
effect was a unified economy." 10 
THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT 
Use of the police power to regulate economic conditions left a number 
of questions unanswered. How much could government, operating under the 
broad banner of "public health and safety," invade fundamental areas of indi-
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vidual freedom and privacy? Did the police power justify the sterilization of 
certain persons if the majority decided that it was necessary for the welfare 
of the general society? Should courts defer to these legislative judgments? 
Some of the early decisions by federal courts rejected efforts by states 
to sterilize prisoners for eugenic reasons. In 1914 a federal district court 
struck down a law in Iowa that required the vasectomy of criminals con-
victed twice of a felony. Part of the legal problem lay with the definition of 
felony, which has been broadened to cover offenses previously considered 
misdemeanors, such as breaking an electric globe or unfastening a strap in a 
harness. 11 The district court regarded vasectomy as a cruel and unusual 
pwlishment: "This belongs to the Dark Ages." In 1918 another federal dis-
trict court struck down a Nevada law on sterilization as a cruel and unusual 
pwlishment. Vasectomy was optional, meaning that its use depended on the 
proclivities of a judge. 12 
The case that reached the Supreme Court came out of Virginia. In 
1925 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the state 's compulsory 
sterilization law. Carrie Buck had been committed to the State Colony for 
Epilectics and Feeble-Minded at the age of eighteen. Her mother had been 
committed to the same institution, and Carrie had just given birth to an ille-
gitimate child which the state claimed was of "defective mentality." Under 
Virginia law, the superintendent of the institution could propose to a board 
that a mental defective be sterilized - by vasectomy for a man or salpin-
gectomy (cutting the Fallopian tubes) for a woman. The statute claimed that 
"heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, im-
becility, epilepsy and crime." 13 The Virginia court concluded that the right 
to enact sterilization laws "rests in the police power." 
By an 8-1 majority, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell (1927) affirmed 
the decision of the Virginia court. Writing for the court, Justice Holmes dis-
missed Buck's appeal by noting that the public welfare 
may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would 
be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap 
the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often 
not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent 
our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all 
the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate off-
spring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbelicity, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compul-
sory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fal-
lopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough. 
Holmes did more than merely defer to the Virginia legislature. He equated 
vaccination with vasectomy and salpingectomy, argued that compulsory military 
service somehow justified compulsory sterilization, and spoke of degenerate 
offspring committing crime when crime was never an issue with Carrie Buck. 
How could a self-styled skeptic enthusiastically endorse the theory supporting 
12 
the Virginia law? The statute claimed that heredity played an important role 
in transmitting not only insanity, idiocy, imbecility and epilepsy but also crime. 
Even Brandeis, with his passion for discovering facts, joined the Holmes de-
cision. 
The Court of 1927 was operating in a social environment that believed 
that crime could be controlled by sterilization . The 1877 study by Richard Louis 
Dugdale, The Jukes, popularized the notion that crime was largely heredity. 
Cesare Lombroso's Criminal Man (1896-97) identified anthropological features 
that marked the born criminal. A study published in 1893 claimed that "it is 
established beyond controversy that criminals and paupers, both, are degen-
erate; the imperfect, knotty, knurly, worm-eaten, half-rotten fruit of the 
race." 14 The eugenics movement supplied the answer: sterilization. 
In the hands of reformers and progressives, eugenics became a respected 
argument for opposing miscegenation and excluding "lower stock" immigrants 
from the Mediterranean countries, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Sterilization 
was to have wide application. A model eugenical sterilization law encompassed 
those who were feeble-minded, insane, criminalistic (including the delinquent 
and "wayward"), epilectic, inebriates and drug users, diseased (including tu-
berculosis, syphilis, and leprosy), blind (including seriously impaired vision), 
deaf (including seriously impaired hearing), deformed (including the crippled), 
and dependents "including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps, and 
paupers." 15 
Carrie Buck's counsel had warned the Supreme Court that in place of "the 
constitutional government of the fathers we shall have set up Plato's Republic." 
His remarks preceded by a few years Nazi Germany's biological experiments 
and the extermination of millions of Jews, Poles, gypsies, and other groups to 
produce a "master race." 
Although Buck v. Bell has neven been explicitly overruled, its tenets were 
challenged by the Supreme Court in 1942. Oklahoma law provided for the 
sterilization of "habitual criminals." A unanimous opinion held that the state 
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
making an invidious distinction. Under the statute, someone who stole more 
than $20 three times would be sterilized, whereas someone who embezzled 
that amount three times was exempt from the operation, even though both 
crimes were a felony under state law. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court 
did not comment on the scope of the police power to mandate sterilization. 
He did note that the case involved "one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race." 16 Chief Justice Stone, in a concurrence, said that a state could, after 
appropriate inquiry, sterilize someone "to prevent the transmission by inher-
itance of his socially injurious tendencies ." Justice Jackson, also concurring, 
insisted that there are limits to the extent that legislatures "may conduct 
biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural 
powers of a minority - even those who have been guilty of what the majority 
defines as crimes." Jackson's reservations have been underscored by recent 
cases involving the rights of marriage, family, and privacy. 
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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
1n Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Chief Justice Taney refused to allow 
contemporary social attitudes to alter the meaning of the Constitution. No 
one, he said, "supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling" toward 
blacks "should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a 
more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear 
when the instrument was framed and adopted." Although the Fourteenth 
Amendment later provided for the equality of whites and blacks before the 
law, some states invoked the police power to maintain separate facilities. 
In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana 
statute that required railroads to provide equal, but separate, accommoda-
tions for white and black passengers. At that time the tide of public opinion 
ran strongly against the idea of shared accommodations. In a ruling that re-
lied heavily on social mores and customs, the Court said that "in the nature 
of things" it could not have been the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to abolish distinctions based on color or to enforce a social commingling of 
the races. Segregation laws were within the competency of the states to ex-
ercise their police power. States were at liberty "to act with reference to 
the established usages, customs and traditions of the people." Separation 
between the races became widespread in transportation, schools, restau-
rants, theaters, and hotels. 
The combination of racism in totalitarian countries and the emergence 
of America as world leader after World War II helped set the stage for the 
Desegregation Decision of 1954. America could not fight world communism 
and appeal to dark-skinned peoples in foreign lands if it maintained racial 
segregation in its own school system. The National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) prepared an appendix to its brief 
entitled "The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegrega-
tion: A Social Science Statement." Justice Jackson viewed the NAACP's ar-
gument as sociology rather than Jaw and was reluctant to rule segregation 
unconstitutional. He finally agreed to join the majority and form a unanimous 
Court, but acknowledged privately that he regarded the case as basically a 
question of politics: "I don't know how to justify the abolition of segregation 
as a judicial act. Our problem is to make a judicial decision out of a political 
conclusion .. " 17 
In the Desegregation Case of 1954, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that in approaching the problem of school segregation "we cannot tum the 
clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or 
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written." Conditions had 
changed; public education was now compulsory, and education had become 
"perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." Seg-
regation, said the Court, generated a feeling of inferiority among black chil-
dren: "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at 
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that segregation was detrimen-
tal to •education] is amply supported by modem authority." This sentence 
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was followed by the famous footnote eleven, the wisdom of which has been 
extensively debated, citing seven sociological studies on the effects of dis-
crimination and segregation on children. 
Foreign policy implications were also cited in NAACP's brief: "Survival 
of our country in the present international situation is inevitably tied to reso-
lution of this domestic issue." The Federal Government's amicus brief 
agreed that American segregation had harmful effects on the foreign policy 
of the executive branch. The problem of racial discrimination was "particu-
larly acute in the District of Columbia, the nation's capital. This city is the 
window through which the world looks into our house." Foreign officials and 
visitors judged the country by their experiences and observations in the Dis-
trict. ot only were black citizens humiliated but dark-skinned foreign offi-
cials were mistaken for American blacks and refused food, lodging, and 
entertainment. The brief continued: 
It is in the context the of present world struggle 
between freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial 
discrimination must be viewed .... The existence of dis-
crimination against minority groups in the United States 
has an adverse effect upon our relations with other coun-
tries. Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Com-
munist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even among 
friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the 
democratic faith. 
One year after the Court decided the Desegregation Case, it was faced 
with the constitutionality of a miscegenation statute from Virginia. The Court 
decided to sidestep temporarily a socially explosive issue. Immediately after 
the Court had issued its decision on desegregation, opponents predicted that 
integrated schools would lead to "mongrelization" of the white race. The lower 
court, in upholding the statute, said that it was necessary for the state to forbid 
interracial marriages "so that it shall not have a mongrel breed of citizens." 18 
The Supreme Court returned the case to the state courts, giving time 
for the Desegregation Decision to establish itself as the law of the land. 19 By 
1967 the Court was prepared to strike down the miscegenation law and it did 
so with a unanimous ruling in Loving v. Virginia. The opinion pointed out that 
14 states in the previous 15 years had repealed laws prohibiting interracial 
marriages. Contemporary public opinion obviously played a part, for the Court 
rejected the argument that the state law should be upheld because the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit miscegenation laws. 
Under the Constitution, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State." 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
On the foundation of court cases that established rights for black Amer-
icans, the feminist movement pressed for fundamental changes in women's 
rights. It is extraordinary to read some of the early Supreme Court deci-
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sions on women's rights to see how social attitudes were interwoven into 
the opinions of Justices. Bradwell v. State (1873) is a prime example. Myra 
Bradwell had obtained a law degree but needed the support of a panel of 
judges to practice law in Illinois. They turned her down solely because she 
was a woman. An 8-1 Supreme Court decided that her rejection did not vio-
late the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A concurrence by Justice Bradley claimed that the "natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for 
many of the occupations of civil life." A woman's responsibility to domestic 
life and to the family institution made it "repugnant" for her to adopt an in-
dependent career from that of her husband. He recognized that his argu-
ment did not apply to unmarried women, but they were exceptions to the 
general rule: "The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the 
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. 
And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of 
things, and cannot be based on exceptional cases." 
Court doctrine had not advanced very far by the time of Goesaert v. 
Cleary (1948). A 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan stat-
ute that prohibited women from serving as bartenders unless they were the 
wife or daughter of the male owner. Frankfurter's decision for the majority 
is remarkable for its smug assurance: "Beguiling as the subject is, it need 
not detain us long. To ask whether or not the Equal Protection of the Laws 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred Michigan from making the 
classification the State has made . . . is one of those rare instances where 
to state the question is in effect to answer it." Three members of the Court 
dissented on the ground that the statute arbitrarily discriminated between 
men and women. 
Judicial attitudes were not changed until well after the Desegregation 
Case of 1954. The correction came first from Congress, not the courts. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination based on sex. Congress 
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to investigate 
cases of discrimination, and much of the caseload has been devoted to cases 
of sex discrimination. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibited employers from 
discriminating on the basis of sex. 
Changes in Supreme Court doctrine did not come until Warren Burger 
replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice. In Reed v. Reed (1971), a unanimous 
Court struck down an Idaho law that preferred men over women in adminis-
tering estates. The statute, the Court held, arbitrarily discriminated on the 
basis of sex and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Since that time there has been a flood of cases that are gradu-
ally eliminating sexual stereotypes of an earlier age. In Frontiero v. Richard-
son (1973), the Court said that sex discrimination had survived in America 
as "romantic paternalism," whereas the practical effect was to put women 
"not on a pedestal, but in a cage." In Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), the Court 
held that whatever the customs of earlier times "it is no longer tenable" to 
exclude women from juries. In that same year, in Stanton v. Stanton, the 
Court said that "old notions" of sex roles are in decline. 
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CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS 
New appointments allow the Supreme Court to incorporate contempo-
rary social and political attitudes. Although Justices sometimes object that 
precedents are too easily abandoned and the principle of stare decisis ig-
nored, new Justices bring fresh ideas and philosophies to the Court. In a 
dissent, Justice Black complained in Rogers v. Bellei (1971) that constitu-
tional protections "should not be blown around by every passing political 
wind that changes the composition of this Court." No doubt he was frus-
trated by policy shifts from the Warren Court to the Burger Court, yet 
Black himself had been part of the Roosevelt appointees in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s who helped chart a new course in constitutional interpreta-
tion. 
It was the view of Justice Jackson that changes in the Court's composi-
tion enable it to incorporate contemporary ideas and attitudes. He denied 
that this admission did violence to the notion of an independent, non-political 
judiciary: "let us not deceive ourselves; long-sustained public opinion does 
influence the process of constitutional interpretation. Each new member of 
the everchanging personnel of our courts brings to his task the assumptions 
and accustomed thought of a later period. The practical play of the forces of 
politics is such that judicial power has often delayed but never permanently 
defeated the persistent will of a substantial majority." 20 
By recongizing the force of social movements and public opinion, do we 
reduce the judiciary to just another political body responding to majoritarian 
pressures? Not necessarily. If the Court succumbs to social needs in such 
areas as economic regulation, so are there examples - school prayer, 
school busing, abortion - where the Court remains steadfast in the teeth of 
intense opposition. In one of the most majestic paragraphs in Supreme 
Court history, Justice Jackson in 1943 struck down a mandatory flag salute 
and declared that the "very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw cer-
tain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and prop-
erty, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections." 
It is nonetheless a fact that constitutional rights depend to a substantial 
extent on contemporary standards and majority opinion. Jackson could write 
what he did in 1943 partly because Frankfurter's decision in 1940, upholding 
a mandatory flag salute, had aroused almost uniform opposition throughout 
the country. In such areas as obscenity, law enforcement, and the death 
penalty, the Supreme Courts attempts to determine "contemporary stand-
ards" and "evolving standards of decency." 21 Justice Frankfurter, in a death 
penalty case, felt obliged to follow "that consensus of society's opinion 
which, for purposes of due process, is the standard enjoined by the Consti-
tution." 22 When legislatures passed death sentences for certain crimes, ju-
17 
rors often refused to return guilty verdicts and forced legislatures to permit 
discretionary jury sentencing. 
It would be misleading to say that constitutional rights merely reflect 
contemporary values. If that were the case, we could dispense with the 
Constitution and simply legislate all constitutional questions. The Constitu-
tion is revered because it represents enduring values and a consensus of 
broad moral and political ideas. The fundamental principle that man cannot 
be governed without his consent created an inherent conflict between the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, which sanctioned, at least 
for a time, the institution of slavery. This basic incompatibility between nat-
ural rights and the Constitution had to be redressed, if not by the courts 
and Congress then by civil war. 
Two cases in 1986 demonstrate the Court's sensitivity to social atti-
tudes. California v. Ciraolo concerned flights by police officers over a back-
yard to discover marijuana plants. The Court claimed that the grower's 
"expectation that his garden was protected from such observation is unrea-
sonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor." In 
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court by a 5-4 margin upheld a state law that 
made consensual sodomy among homosexuals a criminal offense. The Court 
rejected the argument that the law should be struck down because it merely 
reflects the "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." The Court noted that the 
law "is constantly based on notions of morality." Justice Stevens, dissenting, 
pointed out that the fact that a majority in Georgia views sodomy as immo-
ral "is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; 
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack." 
Finally, constitutional law is not a monopoly of the courts. Constitu-
tional law is also made by the people operating through the executive and 
legislative branches. Many constitutional issues are resolved without a law-
suit, though that is often difficult to imagine in our litigious society. Con-
gress and executive officials are constantly involved in constitutional 
interpretation through the passage of bills, agency implementation, and ex-
ecutive-legislative conflicts. Even when a matter is brought before the 
courts there is no assurance it will be decided there. The judiciary can avoid 
the constitutional issue by disposing of a case on statutory grounds or by 
raising the threshold questions of jurisdiction, standing, mootness, ripeness, 
political questions, and prudential considerations. If the constitutional ques-
tion is decided, more likely than not the courts will defer to the interpreta-
tion previously reached by the other branches. On those rare occasions 
where the courts invalidate a congressional action, usually it is only a matter 
of time before the statute is revised slightly to initiate another dialogue with 
the judiciary. It is through this rich and dynamic political process that the 
Constitution is constantly adapted to seek a harmony between legal princi-
ples and the needs of a changing society. 
t The views expressed here are those solely of the author, but he would like to thank Peter 
Benda and Morton Rosenberg for their helpful critiques of the draft . 
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